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Measuring the Justice Gap: Flaws 
in the Interstate Allocation of 
Civil Legal Services Funding and 
a Proposed Remedy 
 
Dion Chu,* Matthew R. Greenfield,** and Peter 
Zuckerman***† 
 
I. Introduction 
 
While Justice Lewis Powell, Jr. famously stated that it was 
“fundamental that justice should be the same, in substance and 
availability, without regard to economic status,”1 the available 
evidence suggests that Justice Powell’s ideal of equal access 
remains unrealized. Rather, as the Legal Services Corporation 
(“LSC”) has found, in the United States “there continues to be a 
major gap between the civil legal needs of low-income people 
and the legal help that they receive.”2 Underscoring the extent 
of this “justice gap,” the LSC concluded in 2009 that: (i) “for 
every client served by an LSC-funded program,” one had to be 
turned away because of inadequate resources; (ii) fewer than 
 
  * U.S. Rates Trading Associate—Jefferies & Company. 
  ** Law Clerk to the Honorable Sidney H. Stein—U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York.  
    *** Associate—Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. 
  † This article represents the opinions and legal conclusions of its authors 
and not necessarily those of their respective employers. 
1. Lewis Powell. Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Remarks made as 
President of the American Bar Association, 
http://www.nlada.org/News/Equal_Justice_Quotes [hereinafter Powell 
Remarks]. 
2. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE 
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter LSC, 2009 JUSTICE GAP REPORT]. The LSC’s 2009 study updates a 
2005 report that reached the same conclusion about the existence of a justice 
gap. See id.; LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: 
THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 4 (2005) 
(finding “a major gap between the legal needs of low-income people and the 
legal help that they receive”). 
1
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twenty percent (20%) of legal problems encountered by low-
income people were addressed by a lawyer; (iii) only one legal 
aid attorney was available for every 6415 low-income 
individuals (in contrast, one private attorney was available for 
every 429 individuals above the LSC-eligible income threshold); 
and, (iv) state courts were experiencing large increases in the 
number of unrepresented litigants unable to afford a lawyer.3 
Given the troubling scale of the justice gap identified by 
the LSC, this study attempts to explore why the delivery of 
legal services to low-income individuals in the United States 
falls so far short of Powell’s ideal. The easy answer is that 
funding for legal services is grossly inadequate,4 but 
recognizing that “[w]e have been too quick to assume that all 
we need is money to solve the access problem,”5 this study looks 
beyond the easy answer and argues that the magnitude of 
funding is only part of the problem. The focus of our 
investigation is the way that legal services funds—both LSC 
and non-LSC funds—are allocated across states. Relying on 
data from the Civil Justice Infrastructure Mapping Project’s 
Access Across America report,6 the LSC’s Fact Book 2010,7 and 
our own data measuring various legal needs, we find that 
funding tends to be insensitive to actual demand for legal 
services. With the supply of legal services not particularly 
responsive to demand, we conclude that the justice gap could 
be narrowed simply by reforming the way in which 
policymakers distribute legal services funds while holding 
constant the total amount of funds distributed. 
In reaching this conclusion, we proceed in two parts. First, 
drawing largely from Access Across America and LSC data, we 
 
3. See LSC, 2009 JUSTICE GAP REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
4. See id. at 2-3 (arguing that LSC funding should be doubled). 
5. JEANNE CHARN & RICHARD ZORZA, CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR ALL 
AMERICANS 15 (2005), available at http://www.zorza.net/Bellow-
Sacks/Cover.pdf. 
6. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, ACCESS ACROSS 
AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING 
PROJECT (2011) [hereinafter ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA]. 
7. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., FACT BOOK 2010 (2011) [hereinafter LSC, 
FACT BOOK 2010], available at 
http://grants.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/Grants/Fact_Book_2010.pdf. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/3
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analyze the supply of legal services funding across states. Since 
eligibility for LSC funds is principally determined by income 
(only individuals in households with income at or below 125% 
of the federal poverty level are LSC eligible),8 variations in 
legal services funding among states are strongly correlated 
with LSC eligibility levels. However, LSC funding likely 
accounts for well under forty-three percent (43%) of overall 
legal services funding, with the remainder (“non-LSC funding”) 
generated by, inter alia, state and local grants, filing fees, 
interest on lawyer trust accounts (“IOLTA”), and private 
grants.9 Because the precise magnitude of non-LSC funding is 
unclear, we estimate it with three different measures. Using 
each of these measures, we then analyze its disparity among 
states. In every case, after explaining Access Across America’s 
finding that non-LSC funding is not proportional to 
population,10 we conclude that it also has no statistically 
significant relationship to key economic indicators, such as 
LSC eligibility, median household income, or unemployment. 
In fact, of the variables we tested, only the number of lawyers 
 
8. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(c) (2011). Eligibility is determined in 
accordance with the poverty guidelines set annually by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“DHHS”). See id. § 1611.3(c)(1). The DHHS 
currently defines poverty-level income for a one-person household as $11,170 
and for a four-person family as $23,050. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty 
Guidelines, 77 Fed. Reg. 4034-35 (Jan. 26, 2012). Thus, for the year 2012, a 
person living alone is eligible for LSC-provided legal services if he earns no 
more than $13,962.50, and a person living in a four-person household is 
eligible if the household earns no more than $28,812.50. Notably, however, 
the threshold for poverty under the guidelines is higher for residents of 
Alaska and Hawaii. See id. 
9. Part II.A, infra, explores various estimates of the magnitude of non-
LSC funding. The LSC’s Fact Book 2010 provides a lower bound for non-LSC 
funding (and thus, an upper bound for LSC funding) because it indicates that 
among LSC-funded organizations, about fifty-seven percent (57%) of funds 
are not supplied by the LSC. See LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 8. 
The overall proportion of non-LSC funds must be higher than fifty-seven 
percent (57%) because some non-LSC funds go to organizations that do not 
receive any LSC funds. To be sure, in Access Across America, non-LSC 
funding accounts for under forty percent (40%) of total funding but only 
because the report considers non-LSC funding merely from court fines, court 
fees, and legislative appropriations. See SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 6, at 
136-37. 
10. See SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 6, at 18-19. 
3
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in a state relates significantly to any of our measures of non-
LSC funding, and of these three measures, the only one for 
which the number of lawyers has statistical significance is non-
LSC funding received by organizations that also receive LSC 
funding. 
After examining how legal services funds are supplied 
across states, we then analyze how they are demanded. 
Measuring demand is quite challenging, particularly on the 
state level, because it requires assessing not the amount of 
legal services that low-income individuals do use, but rather 
the amount that they want to use, which is an unobservable 
variable. The LSC has attempted to measure such demand 
through a survey of individuals seeking assistance from LSC-
funded programs, but, as the LSC concedes, this approach 
comes with inherent limitations that likely under-represent 
unmet needs.11 We therefore take a different approach: after 
assuming that the overall frequency with which civil legal 
services are delivered reflects the relative demand for these 
services across states, we estimate demand within each state 
through proxies for the most significant categories of services. 
Because, according to LSC data, nearly eighty-five percent 
(85%) of LSC-eligible cases arise from just four types of 
disputes (consumer finance, family, housing, and income),12 we 
can reasonably project state-level demand for legal services by 
estimating the frequency of these disputes within each state. 
Upon doing so, we find that there is no clear connection 
between state-level demand and supply, particularly with 
respect to LSC funding. In other words, states with the 
greatest need for LSC funding (because their residents 
encounter legal problems the most based on our estimates) do 
not necessarily have more funding than states with lower 
funding needs. 
Though we recognize that fixing this imbalance will not be 
easy, we conclude by offering a proposal that attempts to do so. 
In this regard, we recommend that the LSC move away from 
complete reliance on an income-based test toward a needs-
 
11. See LSC, 2009 JUSTICE GAP REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-11. 
12. See LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 27. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/3
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based test. Such a framework would allow the LSC to more 
effectively serve unmet demand for civil legal services and 
thus, help realize Justice Powell’s ideal. 
 
II. Supply of Legal Services Funding 
 
In this Part, we analyze the supply of LSC and non-LSC 
funding. We show that whereas LSC funding is almost entirely 
explained by a state’s LSC-eligible population, non-LSC 
funding (however estimated) is allocated idiosyncratically and 
thus, cannot be explained by ostensibly important economic, 
legal, and demographic variables. 
 
A. Types of Legal Services Funding 
 
In examining the drivers of the supply of legal funding 
across states, we divide our analysis into two parts, focusing 
first on LSC funding and then turning to non-LSC funding. 
This division is necessary because, as explained further below, 
LSC funding is in large part statutorily determined through a 
means test, while non-LSC funding is largely determined by 
the states themselves, on a more ad hoc basis that makes use of 
a number of delivery methods. Unfortunately, this also means 
that whereas LSC funding is easily ascertainable, non-LSC 
funding is impossible to precisely quantify. Given this 
difficulty, we estimate non-LSC funding in three different 
ways, examining: (i) the non-LSC funding received by LSC-
funded programs (“non-LSC 1”), (ii) the state-generated 
funding reported in Access Across America (“non-LSC 2”), and 
(iii) the sum of these two measures (“non-LSC 3”). 
To be sure, each of these three measures is not without 
problems. Both non-LSC 1 and non-LSC 2 underestimate total 
non-LSC funding, the former because some programs that are 
not funded by the LSC receive non-LSC funding and the latter 
because some non-LSC funding comes from sources other than 
court fees, court fines, and legislative appropriations (the only 
sources that Access Across America examines).13 Further, non-
 
13. See SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 6, at 136-37. 
5
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LSC 3 is imperfect not only as a result of the deficiencies 
associated with non-LSC 1 and non-LSC 2, but also because 
non-LSC 1 and non-LSC 2 overlap to an unquantifiable 
extent.14 In spite of these unavoidable problems, our estimates 
of non-LSC funding at the least offer a useful starting point for 
analyzing the disparities in such funding across states. Indeed, 
as we discuss in greater detail in Part II.C below, all three 
measures strongly suggest that non-LSC funding is 
idiosyncratically determined, distributed in magnitudes that 
are not closely connected to ostensibly significant economic, 
legal, and demographic variables. 
Illustrating these magnitudes as well as the magnitude of 
LSC funding, Table 1 summarizes the size and breakdown of 
legal services funding across the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia. Notably, the total legal services funding estimate 
based on LSC and Non-LSC 3, approximately $1.2 billion, is 
quite close to a recent $1.3 billion estimate of total funding 
based on data from the American Bar Association.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. See Email from Rebecca Sandefur, Senior Res. Soc. Scientist, Am. 
Bar Found., to Peter Zuckerman (Mar. 8, 2012, 10:27 AM EST) (on file with 
authors) (noting that “there’s undoubtedly double-counting in [the LSC and 
Access Across America] data sources, but there’s no way to identify it and 
account for it given the way data are currently collected and reported”). 
15. ALAN HOUSEMAN, CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE 
FOR 2009, at 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/CIVIL-LEGAL-AID-IN-
THE-UNITED-STATES-2.pdf. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/3
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Table 1: LSC and Non-LSC Funding (2009/2010)16 
 
Type of Funding Amount 
LSC % of 
Total 
LSC $395,915,410  
Non-LSC   
Non-LSC 1 $534,757,305  
Non-LSC 2 $226,729,917  
Non-LSC 3 $761,487,222  
TOTAL LSC + Non-LSC 1 $930,672,715 42.5% 
TOTAL LSC + Non-LSC 2 $622,645,327 63.6% 
TOTAL LSC + Non-LSC 3 $1,157,402,632 34.2% 
 
B. LSC Funding 
 
Section 1007(a)(2)(A) of the Legal Services Corporation Act 
of 1974 requires that the LSC “establish, in consultation with 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and with 
the Governors of the several States, maximum income levels 
(taking into account family size, urban and rural differences, 
and substantial cost-of-living variations) for individuals eligible 
for legal assistance . . . .”17 Pursuant to this directive, in its own 
regulations the LSC has provided that “every recipient [of LSC 
funds] shall establish annual income ceilings for individuals 
and households, which may not exceed one hundred and twenty 
five percent (125%) of the current official Federal Poverty 
Guidelines amounts.”18 Thus, those with incomes above 125% 
of the federal poverty level are ineligible for LSC funds, and 
“LSC basic field funding is allocated on the basis of census 
 
16. See LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 9-10; SANDEFUR & SMYTH, 
supra note 6, at 31-132. The LSC Funding and Non-LSC 1 figures are based 
on data from 2010 while the Non-LSC 2 measure is largely based on data 
from 2009. 
17. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 § 1007(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 
2996f(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
18. 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(c)(1) (2013). 
7
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counts of the poverty population in the service area.”19 One 
might therefore expect the number of people in a state whose 
income falls below the 125% threshold (the “LSC-eligible 
population”) to be highly correlated with the amount of LSC 
funding that a state receives. 
 
Figure 1: Map of Population-Normalized LSC 
Funding by State 
 
 
Both our results and those in Access Across America 
confirm this expectation. Access Across America finds that 
“[LSC] funds are distributed with little disparity” relative to a 
state’s LSC-eligible population.20 That is, fifty-nine percent 
(59%) of states receive an amount of LSC funding “at parity” 
with what their LSC-eligible population would suggest, while 
only twenty-four percent (24%) of states receive an amount 
“above parity,” and just eighteen percent (18%) obtain an 
 
19. Linda E. Perle, Legal Services Corporation Funding for 2012: 
Concern About Proposed Reductions, CLASP (Jun. 14, 2011), 
http://www.clasp.org/issues/in_focus?type=civil_legal_assistance&id=0005. 
20. SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 6, at 17-18. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/3
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amount “below parity.”21 Further, among the states that do not 
receive funding perfectly proportional to their LSC-eligible 
populations, average deviations from parity tend to be small (at 
least compared to average non-LSC funding deviations).22 
We reach a similar conclusion using a linear regression. 
Specifically, we regress each state’s receipt of LSC funding on a 
set of variables intended to proxy for potentially relevant 
economic, legal, and demographic attributes. For economic 
attributes, we look at: (i) the state’s LSC-eligible population;23 
(ii) the dollar amount of taxes it collects;24 (iii) its median 
household income;25 (iv) the state’s percentage of total 
enrollment in the Federal Supplemental Nutritional Assistance 
Program (“SNAP” or “food stamp” program);26 (v) the dollar 
amount of SNAP funds the state distributes;27 and (vi) its 
unemployment rate.28 For legal attributes, we examine: (i) the 
number of lawyers in the state;29 (ii) whether the state has 
adopted ABA Model Rule 5.3 (requiring that lawyers have 
 
21. Id. at 19. To evaluate parity of LSC funding, Access Across America 
calculates a ratio for each state equal to the percentage of total LSC funds 
received in that state (that is, the LSC funds received in that state divided by 
all LSC funds distributed nationally) divided by the percentage of total LSC-
eligible population that lives in that state. Id. at 18 n.2. Ratios of 1.0 are 
considered “at parity,” while ratios above 1.0 are considered “above parity,” 
and ratios below 1.0 are deemed “below parity.” Id. 
22. See id. at 19 (noting that among “above parity” states, the average 
ratio of actual to predicted LSC funding is 1.5, compared to 2.4 for a non-LSC 
state-generated funding metric calculated based on state population over 
total population, and that among “below parity” states, the average ratio is 
0.7, compared to 0.4 for the state-generated funding metric); see also infra 
text accompanying note 40. 
23. As reported by SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 6, at 31-132. 
24. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 288 tbl.453, 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/stlocgov.pdf. 
25. Id. at 460 tbl.706, available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/income.pdf. 
26. Id. at 367 tbl.571, available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/socins.pdf; id. at 19 tbl.14, 
available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0014.pdf. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 405 tbl.629, available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/labor.pdf. 
29. As reported by SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 6, at 31-132. 
9
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supervising authority over non-lawyers that they employ);30 
and, (iii) the number of civil cases per capita in the state.31 
Finally, for demographic attributes, we turn to: (i) the state’s 
percentage of Democratic Party votes in the 2008 presidential 
election;32 (ii) the median age of the state’s population;33 and 
(iii) the state’s population density.34 Table 2 below shows the 
results of our regression using these three groups of variables. 
 
 
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_5_3_responsibilities_regarding_no
nlawyer_assistant.html. We code adoption data based upon reports in 
SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 6, at 31-132. 
31. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 24, at 211 tbl.335, available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/law.pdf; id. at 19 tbl.14, 
available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0014.pdf. 
32. This variable measures the percentage of votes cast in the state in 
the 2008 presidential election for Barack Obama. Id. at 250 tbl.406, available 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/election.pdf. 
33. Id. at 21 tbl.16, available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/pop.pdf. 
34. Id. at 19 tbl.14, available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/pop.pdf. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/3
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Table 2: Linear Regression of LSC Funding by State 
 
Table 2 indicates that of our twelve dependent variables, only 
six have a statistically significant relationship with LSC 
funding at a level of five percent (5%) or less. And among this 
latter group of variables, LSC-eligible population is the most 
statistically significant by a factor of two. Its coefficient implies 
that for every person below the 125% poverty threshold, a state 
receives about $6.73 in LSC funding. 
While not as powerful, the other statistically significant 
variables also offer some interesting insights on the allocation 
of LSC funding. In particular, Table 2 suggests that states with 
Coefficient Estimate T-Statistic 
Intercept -1.96 x 106 -0.62 
Economic Variables   
LSC-Eligible Population  6.73 x 100*** 8.05 
Taxes Collected ($) 1.13 x 10-4** 2.78 
Median Household  
Income ($) 
2.70 x 101 1.09 
Food Stamp Enrollment (%) 2.52 x 107*** 4.02 
Food Stamps Distributed ($) -1.92 x 10-3** -2.92 
Unemployment  
Rate (%) 
-3.20 x 107 -1.63 
Legal Variables   
Lawyers 6.72 x 101** 3.41 
Adoption of ABA R. 5.3 5.11 x 104 0.13 
Civil Cases per Capita -4.02 x 106 -0.62 
Demographic Variables   
Democratic Party Votes (%) -2.95 x 106 -1.10 
Median Age 7.18 x 103 0.08 
Population Density (sq. mi.) -7.10 x 102** -3.30 
Statistical Significance: *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05  
R-squared: 0.99; Adjusted R-squared: 0.99 
R-squared: 0.99 
 
11
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lower population densities receive more funding (about $709.50 
for every fewer person per square mile) while at the same time, 
states with more lawyers receive more funding (about $67.20 
for every additional lawyer). The relationship between funding 
and population density might stem from the relatively high 
cost of providing legal services to more spread-out populations, 
including perhaps the need for more legal services offices to 
maintain a threshold of accessibility. The relationship between 
funding and the number of lawyers is more difficult to explain 
intuitively, although it is possible that additional lawyers 
render a state better able to attract or use funding. 
The coefficients of the other three statistically significant 
variables, relating to economic attributes, can also be explained 
in terms of need and capacity for funding. On the one hand, 
Table 2 suggests that for every $10,000 of taxes collected, a 
state receives approximately $1.13 of additional LSC funds. 
While this result might appear counterintuitive on the grounds 
that states collecting more taxes should be able to rely more on 
local funding, it is reasonable if one believes that states with 
higher tax revenues are better able to support organizations 
that receive legal services funding, whether from LSC or non-
LSC sources. In this sense, tax revenue serves as a proxy for 
capacity to receive funding. On the other hand, food stamp 
(SNAP) enrollment percentage might be interpreted as a proxy 
for funding need. Under this view, it is not surprising that 
every additional percentage point of food stamp enrollment is 
associated with about $252,100 of additional LSC funding. 
Further, for a given level of food stamp enrollment, the amount 
of food stamps distributed might be negatively correlated with 
LSC funding (such that every $1,000 of food stamps distributed 
is associated with a $1.92 reduction in funding) because 
individuals that receive more food stamps might have less need 
for certain legal services (particularly, those related to income). 
But whether or not this narrative and those relating to the 
other variables aside from LSC eligibility explain what is in 
fact happening, the clearest conclusion from Table 2 is that 
LSC eligibility represents by far the most important driver of 
LSC funding. Indeed, while the regression in Table 2 has a 
high level of fit (an R-squared of 0.99), a simple linear 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/3
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regression of LSC funding on LSC eligibility has almost as high 
of a fit (an R-squared of 0.97). As a practical matter, therefore, 
one can treat LSC funding as determined almost entirely by 
LSC eligibility. 
 
C. Non-LSC Funding 
 
The determinants of non-LSC funding, on the other hand, 
are far less clear because states differ significantly with respect 
to both how they provide non-LSC funding and the extent to 
which they provide it. More fundamentally, since non-LSC 
funding comes from so many different sources, not all of which 
are even publicly available, the magnitude of non-LSC funding 
itself defies precise quantification. For this reason, as 
explained in Part II.A, we adopt three different estimates of 
non-LSC funding. In contrast, Access Across America relies on 
only one. 
But, for all of our measures of non-LSC funding, we reach 
conclusions largely similar to Access Across America. First, we 
confirm Access Across America’s conclusion that “disparity in 
[non-LSC] state-generated funding is much more common and 
much larger” than disparity in LSC funding.35 In particular, 
just as it calculates disparity ratios for LSC funding based on 
each state’s percentage of national LSC funds divided by the 
state’s percentage of LSC-eligible population, Access Across 
America calculates disparity ratios for non-LSC funding (what 
we classify as non-LSC 2) based on each state’s percentage of 
total state-generated funds divided by the state’s percentage of 
total population.36 It finds that based on this latter ratio, only 
six percent (6%) of states are “at parity” (providing non-LSC 
funding commensurate with their population) while fifty-five 
percent (55%) are “below parity” and thirty-five percent (35%) 
are “above parity.”37 Moreover, the deviations from parity are 
quite large: states above parity generate 2.4 times more 
 
35. SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 6, at 18. 
36. Id. at 18 n.2; see also supra note 21. 
37. SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 6, at 18. It is not clear why the 
percentages reported by Access Across America sum to only ninety-six percent 
(96%). 
13
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funding than their relative population suggests (compared to 
1.5 times for the comparable LSC ratio) while those below 
parity generate only 0.4 times as much funding (compared to 
0.7 times for the LSC ratio).38 Conducting similar analysis for 
all of our measures of non-LSC funding, we find similar results, 
with the caveat that the frequency and magnitude of interstate 
disparities are slightly lower—though still quite significant—
for non-LSC funding provided to LSC-funded organizations 
(Non-LSC 1). Table 3 below summarizes these results. 
 
Table 3: Interstate Disparities in Non-LSC Funding39 
 
A. Frequency of Disparities 
 
Category  Non-LSC 1 Non-LSC 2 Non-LSC 3 
States Below 
Parity 
56.9% 62.7% 62.7% 
States At Parity 7.8% 3.9% 3.9% 
States Above 
Parity 
35.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
 
B. Magnitude of Disparities (Proportion of Non-LSC  
 Funding/Proportion of Population) 
 
Category  Non-LSC 1 Non-LSC 2 Non-LSC 3 
States Below 
Parity 
0.49 0.33 0.56 
States Above 
Parity 
1.64 2.37 1.72 
 
 
38. See id. at 19 tbl.2. 
39. Our numbers for non-LSC 2 do not precisely match those reported by 
Access Across America because, for all of our measures, we characterize states 
as “below parity” if their parity score (proportion of non-LSC funding divided 
by proportion of total population) is below 0.95 and “above parity” if their 
score is above 1.05. Slightly changing these bounds does not materially affect 
our results. 
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Though the above disparity analysis clearly indicates that 
non-LSC funding is generally not distributed based on 
population, it is not clear why one would even expect such a 
relationship. Rather, to the extent that non-LSC funding serves 
the same purpose as LSC funding—to help those with few 
economic resources—one might expect non-LSC funding to be 
positively associated with measures of poverty and other 
indicators of economic weakness. To investigate this further, 
we apply our model from Part II.B to each of our measures of 
non-LSC funding. Tables 4 through 6 below show our results. 
 
Figure 2: Map of Population-Normalized Non-LSC 
Funding by State (Non-LSC 1) 
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Figure 3: Map of Non-LSC Funding by State (Non-LSC 2) 
 
Figure 4: Map of Non-LSC Funding by State (Non-LSC 3) 
 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/3
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Table 4: Linear Regression of Non-LSC 1 Funding by 
State 
 
Coefficient Estimate T-Statistic 
Intercept -1.83 x 107 -0.99 
 
Economic Variables 
 
  
LSC-Eligible 
Population  
-5.00 x 100 -1.03 
Taxes Collected ($) 1.60 x 10-4 0.67 
Median Household 
Income ($) 
7.92 x 101 0.55 
Food Stamp 
Enrollment (%) 
-5.15 x 106 -0.14 
Food Stamps 
Distributed ($) 
5.94 x 10-3 1.54 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
-1.00 x 108 -0.87 
 
Legal Variables 
 
  
Lawyers 2.61 x 102* 2.27 
Adoption of ABA R. 
5.3 
3.64 x 106 1.60 
Civil Cases per 
Capita 
4.97 x 107 1.30 
 
Demographic 
Variables 
 
  
Democratic Party 
Votes (%) 
-4.79 x 106 -0.31 
Median Age 4.01 x 105 0.80 
Population Density 
(per sq. mi.) 
-1.21 x 103 -0.97 
Statistical Significance: *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05 
R-squared: 0.86; Adjusted R-squared: 0.82 
17
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Table 5: Linear Regression of Non-LSC 2 Funding by 
State 
 
Coefficient Estimate T-Statistic 
Intercept -2.89 x 107 -1.87 
 
Economic Variables 
 
  
LSC-Eligible 
Population  
3.63 x 100 0.88 
Taxes Collected ($) 1.29 x 10-4 0.65 
Median Household 
Income ($) 
2.27 x 102 1.86 
Food Stamp 
Enrollment (%) 
-2.56 x 107 -0.83 
Food Stamps 
Distributed ($) 
2.27 x 10-4 0.07 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
2.97 x 106 0.03 
 
Legal Variables 
 
  
Lawyers -8.87 x 101 -0.92 
Adoption of ABA R. 
5.3 
2.58 x 106 1.35 
Civil Cases per 
Capita 
2.43 x 107 0.76 
 
Demographic 
Variables 
 
  
Democratic Party 
Votes (%) 
-1.14 x 107 -0.86 
Median Age 6.20 x 105 1.46 
Population Density 
(per sq. mi.) 
1.05 x 103 0.99 
Statistical Significance: *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05 
R-squared: 0.54; Adjusted R-squared: 0.40 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/3
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Table 6: Linear Regression of Non-LSC 3 Funding by 
State 
 
Coefficient Estimate T-Statistic 
Intercept -4.72 x 107 -1.58 
 
Economic Variables 
 
  
LSC-Eligible 
Population  
-1.38 x 100 -0.17 
Taxes Collected ($) 2.89 x 10-4 0.75 
Median Household 
Income ($) 
3.07 x 102 1.30 
Food Stamp 
Enrollment (%) 
-3.08 x 107 -0.52 
Food Stamps 
Distributed ($) 
6.17 x 10-3 0.99 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
-9.73 x 107 -0.52 
 
Legal Variables 
 
  
Lawyers 1.72 x 102 0.92 
Adoption of ABA R. 
5.3 
6.22 x 106 1.68 
Civil Cases per 
Capita 
7.40 x 107 1.19 
 
Demographic 
Variables 
 
  
Democratic Party 
Votes (%) 
-1.62 x 107 -0.63 
Median Age 1.02 x 106 1.25 
Population Density 
(per sq. mi.) 
-1.63 x 102 -0.08 
Statistical Significance: *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05 
R-squared: 0.80; Adjusted R-squared: 0.74 
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Relative to our LSC funding regression, which has six 
statistically significant variables and an R-squared of 0.99, our 
non-LSC funding regressions have considerably lower 
explanatory power. Indeed, in only one of these three 
regressions (for non-LSC 1), is there a statistically significantly 
variable (number of lawyers), and in none of the three 
regressions does the R-squared exceed 0.90. Confirming the 
findings of Access Across America, which restricts its data to 
non-LSC 2, our model proves to be a particularly poor fit for 
non-LSC 2. This suggests that while all non-LSC funding 
might be difficult to explain, funding not associated with LSC-
funded organizations might be especially idiosyncratic. 
Differences in the signs of coefficients are also suggestive 
of differences in the way non-LSC funding is allocated among 
LSC-funded and non-LSC-funded organizations. In particular, 
for our non-LSC 1 regression, the signs of the coefficients on 
the economic variables suggest (albeit without statistical 
significance) that if anything, non-LSC funding tends to be 
associated with economic strength (represented here by, inter 
alia, low LSC-eligible population, high median household 
income, and low unemployment rate) as opposed to economic 
weakness. This in turn suggests that at least for LSC-funded 
organizations, non-LSC funding might be complementing 
rather than substituting for LSC funding, which, as stressed 
above, is highly positively correlated with LSC-eligible 
population. But our non-LSC 2 regression points (albeit quite 
weakly) in the other direction, with a positive coefficient for not 
only LSC-eligible population but also unemployment rate, 
another variable indicating economic weakness. Yet, given the 
low overall explanatory power of our non-LSC 2 regression and 
the signs of certain other economic variables (namely, median 
household income and food stamp enrollment) suggestive of a 
positive association between non-LSC 2 funding and economic 
strength, we are hesitant to draw any broad conclusions based 
on our non-LSC 2 results. 
As for the sole variable that does have statistical 
significance, in Table 4, our explanation is similar to the one 
we offered with respect to LSC funding—namely, the more 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/3
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lawyers that a state has, the better able it is to attract and use 
legal services funding. This explanation appears even stronger 
in the non-LSC context insofar as our results for non-LSC 1 in 
Table 4 suggest that a lawyer has 3.9 times more of an effect on 
non-LSC 1 funding ($261.10 in additional funding for every 
additional lawyer) than on LSC funding ($67.20 in additional 
funding). Yet Table 4 also indicates that the adoption of ABA 
Model Rule 5.3, which has statistical significance at 11.7%, is 
associated with $3,641,000 in added non-LSC 1 funding. One 
might argue that this result is inconsistent with our preceding 
explanation if the adoption of ABA Model Rule 5.3 limits the 
number of legal services providers. However, states might 
simply be reticent to fund legal services programs in which 
non-lawyers provide legal services, as non-lawyers would likely 
have an easier time doing in a jurisdiction that did not adopt 
ABA Model Rule 5.3. Under this view, the adoption of ABA 
Model Rule 5.3 might limit the number of legal services 
providers, but it nonetheless might attract legal services 
funding by alleviating concerns over the quality of the services 
provided. This might also explain why the adoption of ABA 
Model Rule 5.3 is positively associated with both non-LSC 2 
and non-LSC 3 funding as well (in the latter case, with 
statistical significance at 10.1%). 
The impact of ABA Model Rule 5.3 and legal services 
providers on non-LSC funding aside, our results in Tables 4 
through 6 support the central implication of Access Across 
America concerning non-LSC funding—namely, that such 
funding is not allocated by states in a systematic manner. 
Rather, because state-generated funding is not subject to any 
overarching federal standards, states can do as they please. So, 
while some states might be particularly responsive to economic 
indicators, others might not see the need for legal services 
funding at all.40 Owing to this diversity of approaches, it is not 
a surprise that neither we nor Access Across America can 
comprehensively model non-LSC funding across states. 
 
 
40. In fact, in 2009, two states provided no funding at all for civil legal 
services. SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 6, at 18. 
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III.    Demand for Legal Services Funding 
 
In this Part, we analyze the demand for legal services 
funding and conclude that LSC funding is not allocated in a 
manner that optimally satisfies this demand. 
 
A. Sources of Demand 
 
Whereas Part II analyzed the supply of legal services 
funding, this Part analyzes the demand in an effort to connect 
it to supply. Civil legal services come in a wide variety of forms 
and address a wide array of problems,41 in no small part 
because of the breadth of the LSC’s mandate—“providing 
financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal 
proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford 
legal assistance.”42 Indeed, the LSC is subject to few 
restrictions on the civil legal assistance that it can support.43 
But, while the LSC—and non-LSC entities—can fund a broad 
assortment of civil legal services, the evidence indicates that 
low-income individuals principally seek assistance for only four 
types of problems. 
 
Table 7: LSC-Eligible Case Services by Case Type (2010)44 
 
Type of Legal Problem % of Overall Services 
Consumer Finance  12.2% 
Family 34.5% 
Housing 25.2% 
Income 12.7% 
SUBTOTAL 84.6% 
Other 15.4% 
TOTAL 100.0% 
 
41. See, e.g., LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 24-25 (listing LSC-
eligible case types and legal actions). 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (2006). 
43. See id. § 2996f(b) (enumerating these restrictions). 
44. See LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 27. 
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As Table 7 above indicates, in 2010, disputes implicating 
consumer finance, family, housing, and income issues 
accounted for the vast majority of LSC services. While this does 
not necessarily mean that eligible individuals demanded these 
services to a precisely proportionate degree, we nonetheless 
make such an assumption—that is, that the percentage of 
overall services provided is a reasonable proxy for the relative 
demand for these services across states. We make this 
assumption because, for a given level of funding, we can think 
of no compelling reason why, on the whole, LSC-funded 
programs would be significantly better positioned to handle one 
type of legal problem than another. To be sure, if most LSC 
programs could not easily manage a certain legal problem, the 
percentage of cases addressing that problem could materially 
under-represent demand. 
 
Table 8: Estimate of LSC-Eligible Cases Turned Away 
(2008)45 
 
 Type of Legal Problem % Turned Away 
Consumer Finance 47.5% 
Education 56.5% 
Employment 61.1% 
Family 55.6% 
Health 41.9% 
Housing 37.1% 
Income 33.4% 
Individual 74.7% 
Juvenile 55.4% 
Miscellaneous 74.3% 
TOTAL 51.5% 
 
But the evidence indicates that the LSC is not significantly 
more likely to turn away some types of cases than others. 
 
45. See LSC, 2009 JUSTICE GAP REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. In this table, 
as in Table 7, “Housing” includes foreclosure cases. 
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Indeed, Table 8 above, which is based on the LSC’s estimates of 
legal problems turned away relative to overall legal problems 
brought to LSC-funded organizations, suggests not only that 
the four major categories of problems identified in Table 7 do 
not have materially lower than average turn-away rates but 
also that turn-away rates across categories fall within a 
relatively narrow band.46 We therefore assume that the four 
major categories account for almost all of the demand for legal 
services and that, across states, they do so in proportion to the 
relative frequency with which they are provided. 
 
B. Intrastate Proxies of Demand 
 
Given the preceding assumptions that: (i) aggregate 
demand for legal services can be captured by relative demands 
for consumer finance, family, housing, and income services, and 
(ii) relative demands can in turn be captured by the relative 
frequency with which these services are provided across states, 
this Part considers what factors drive demand for legal services 
within states. That is, taking demand for the four major 
categories of legal services across states as given, we attempt to 
estimate the demand for each category within a state. To do so, 
we make one further assumption and then rely on various 
demand proxies linked to the preponderance of disputes in a 
particular category for a particular state. 
 
46. Upon first glance, it may seem that our conclusion here with respect 
to turn-away rates—namely, that these rates do not materially differ among 
legal services categories—is inconsistent with our later conclusion that LSC 
funding is sub-optimally allocated in a manner that does not take into 
account relative demand for legal services. See infra Part III.D. These 
conclusions would conflict if we also concluded that this sub-optimal 
allocation was leading to inefficiently greater supply of some services relative 
to others (in that case, some services would have materially higher turn-away 
rates than others), but we are in fact not making this claim. Rather, our 
conclusion is that the misallocation is distorting the overall size of a state’s 
funding “pie,” yet we do not investigate how this pie is then being divided 
among the major categories of legal services. Indeed, Table 10, infra, which 
demonstrates the effect of misallocation on the overall size of the pie, actually 
assumes that the pie is divided in a manner commensurate with relative 
demand. 
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Our final assumption is that the proportion of LSC-eligible 
residents demanding a specific category of legal services is the 
same across states. In other words, if State A has total demand 
x for one category of legal services and State B has total 
demand y for that category, we are assuming that each state’s 
LSC-eligible population accounts for the same k% of the states’ 
respective levels of demand. By making this assumption, we 
avoid having to directly estimate the demand for legal services 
among the low-income portion of a state’s population and 
instead can simply estimate total state-level demand. Indeed, 
this assumption allows our model to apply to any economic 
subset of a state’s population. So, while this Part implicitly 
assumes that allocations are made only to a state’s LSC-eligible 
population, we could just as easily expand or contract the pool 
of eligible recipients based on another income threshold (or no 
income threshold at all). We believe that we would be justified 
in doing so because we are aware of no systematic differences 
across states that would cause the economic mix of clients 
demanding a particular service to differ significantly. 
With the preceding assumptions in hand, we estimate total 
state-level demand using the following proxies. Since the bulk 
of consumer finance problems stem from bankruptcy and 
collections,47 we estimate the demand for consumer finance 
services with two sets of variables: (i) measures of auto and 
credit card delinquencies from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York’s (“FRBNY”) Consumer Credit Panel48 and (ii) total 
non-corporate bankruptcy filings as reported by the American 
Bankruptcy Institute.49 To proxy for the demand for family law 
services—which predominantly implicate custody, divorce, and 
 
47. See LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 24 (suggesting that 
bankruptcy and collection matters accounted for about 77.6% of all consumer 
finance problems). 
48. See Household Credit, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/creditconditions/ (last visited July 28, 2013) (go to 
“Household Debt and Credit Statistics by County,” under “Resources”). 
49. See Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by State (2007-11), 
AM. BANKR. INST., 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/TemplateRedirect.cfm?template=/CM/ContentDi
splay.cfm&ContentID=65164 (last visited July 28, 2013). 
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domestic abuse disputes50—we turn to the Court Statistics 
Project’s data on domestic relations caseloads by state.51 For 
housing-related services—the majority of which relate to 
landlord/tenant disputes, federally subsidized housing matters, 
and foreclosures52—we rely on data from the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) that estimates 
the number of low-income households with housing problems 
and the number of households living in federally subsidized 
housing.53 Finally, for disputes relating to income—which 
primarily arise from matters concerning food stamps (both 
SNAP- and state-provided), Social Security Disability 
Insurance (“SSDI”), Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”), and 
unemployment compensation54—we look at unemployment 
data from the U.S. Department of Labor55 and Social Security 
data from the U.S. Social Security Administration covering SSI 
and Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (“OASDI”).56 
Table 9 below summarizes our demand proxies and their 
sources. 
 
50. See LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 24 (suggesting that these 
three categories accounted for about 82.2% of all family problems). 
51. See Domestic Relations – Total Caseloads, CT. STAT. PROJECT, 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/SCCS/2010/Total%20Domestic%20Relati
ons%20Caseloads%202.ashx (last visited July 28, 2013) (go to “Domestic 
Relations – Total Caseloads 2009”). 
52. See LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that these 
categories accounted for 55.9%, 16.5%, and 10.1%, respectively, of all housing 
problems). 
53. See A Picture of Subsidized Households – 2008, HUD USER, 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/picture2008/2008_county.zip (last visited July 
28, 2013) (go to “2008_county.zip”); Housing Problems of Low Income 
Households (2009), HUD USER, http://www.huduser.org/tmaps/LI-
household/chas.html (last visited July 28, 2013). 
54. See LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 25 (suggesting that these 
categories accounted for 87.7% of all income problems). 
55. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF WORKFORCE SEC., UNEMP’T INS. 
DATA SUMMARY: 4TH QUARTER 2010 (2011), available at 
http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/content/data_stats/datasum10/DataSum
_2010_4.pdf. 
56. See Congressional Statistics, December 2010, SOC. SEC. ONLINE, 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/factsheets/cong_stats/2010/ (last 
visited July 28, 2013). 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/3
  
2013] MEASURING THE JUSTICE GAP 991 
 
 
Table 9: Demand Proxies 
 
Type of 
Legal 
Problem 
Most Common 
Subtypes (2010 
LSC)57 
Our Demand 
Proxies 
Consumer 
Finance  
Collection (42.9%); 
Bankruptcy (34.7%) 
Auto and Credit Card 
Delinquencies; Non-
Corporate Bankruptcy 
Filings 
Family 
Divorce/Separation 
(38.7%); 
Custody/Visitation 
(28.2%); Domestic 
Abuse (15.2%) 
Domestic Relations 
Caseloads 
Housing 
Landlord/Tenant 
(55.9%); Fed. 
Subsidized Housing 
(16.5%); Mortgage 
Foreclosures 
(10.2%) 
Households Living in 
Federally Subsidized 
Housing; Low Income 
Households with 
Housing Problems  
Income 
SSI (28.5%); 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
(23.2%); Food 
Stamps (15.1%); 
SSDI (10.5%); 
TANF (10.4%) 
OASDI; SSI; 
Unemployment Rate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57. See LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 24-25. 
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C. Model 
 
With the above demand proxies, we estimate a constrained 
linear regression equation to test the extent to which legal 
services funding addresses demand for legal aid services across 
the four major categories of legal problems.58 The equation and 
its constraints are detailed below. 
 
Equation 1: Constrained Linear Regression 
 
 +  +  
 
 + , 
 
where    +  + ;     < 1 
 
As Equation 1 indicates, we are estimating a weight βi for each 
of the four major categories of legal services by regressing 
funding in a given state α over total funding on the demand for 
the category in state α over the total demand for that category 
across states. We impose two constraints: (i) the weights on the 
categories must amount to one, and (ii) each of the weights 
must be greater than zero and less than one. 
If funding is allocated optimally, the estimated βi for each 
of the four major categories should be similar to the percentage 
of services actually provided for that category. That is, if we 
assume that the percentage of services provided reflects the 
relative demand for these services across states—and for 
reasons suggested above, we think that this is a rational 
assumption—we would want this figure to match the 
responsiveness of LSC funding in a given state to demand for a 
given service. 
An example may help illustrate this point. Consider two 
states, States A and B, and two types of legal problems, 
 
58. For details on the theoretical underpinnings of constrained linear 
regression, see generally TAKESHI AMEMIYA, ADVANCED ECONOMETRICS (Harv. 
Univ. Press1985). 
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consumer finance and family. Suppose further that among the 
combined LSC-eligible populations of the two states (or among the 
combined low-income populations, however one wishes to define 
“low income”), consumer finance cases account for twenty five 
percent (25%) and family cases account for seventy-five percent 
(75%) of overall legal services demand, which equals $1 million. 
Finally, suppose that among LSC-eligible populations, State A 
accounts for forty percent (40%) of demand for consumer finance 
services and State B accounts for sixty percent (60%) and that 
State A accounts for sixty percent (60%) of demand for family 
services and State B accounts for forty percent (40%). This means 
that on a dollar basis, if the price of all legal services is the same 
across states, the demand for legal services among State A’s LSC-
eligible population is $550,000 (40% * 25% * $1 million + 60% * 
75% * $1 million) and the demand among State B’s LSC-eligible 
population is $450,000 (60% * 25% * $1 million + 40% * 75% * $1 
million). State A’s LSC-eligible population therefore accounts for 
fifty-five percent (55%) of the dollar demand for legal services, and 
State B’s LSC-eligible population accounts for forty-five percent 
(45%). Our optimal allocation rule would allocate legal services 
funds to the two states in accordance with these percentages. 
Specifically, under the optimal rule, β for consumer finance would 
be 0.25 and β for family would be 0.75. This in turn means that 
State A would receive fifty-five percent (55%) of total LSC funding 
(0.25 * 40% + 0.75 * 60%) and State B would receive forty-five 
percent (45%) (0.25 * 60% + 0.75 * 40%), in line with their relative 
dollar demands. But if instead β for consumer finance were 0.50 
and β for family were 0.50, State A would end up receiving fifty 
percent (50%) of total LSC funding (0.50 * 40% + 0.50 * 60%) and 
State B would receive fifty percent (50%) (0.50 * 60% + 0.50 * 
40%). Under this scenario, State A would be underfunded and 
State B would be overfunded, even if each state then internally 
reallocated its funding in a manner commensurate with relative 
demand for the two categories of legal services.59 Table 10 below 
assumes such a reallocation and summarizes all of the preceding 
results. 
 
59. Indeed, such reallocation would be consistent with the finding in 
Table 8, supra, that turn-away rates are fairly constant across categories of 
legal services. 
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The logic above, captured in Table 10, makes the 
simplifying assumption that prices of legal services are the 
same across states and across type. This assumption regards 
the amount of funds needed to satisfy a given degree of demand 
for a given legal service in one state as commensurate with the 
amount required to satisfy the same degree of demand for 
another legal service in another state. If we further posit that 
the key determinant of the price of legal services is the price of 
labor, our simplifying assumption amounts to a supposition 
that legal labor costs are similar across states and that 
different types of legal services require the same amount of 
labor. Even if neither of these assumptions fully holds, we have 
reason to believe that deviations are not substantial enough to 
materially affect our results. 
To examine the effect of interstate price differences, we 
calculated the correlation between excess LSC funding and 
various price measures such as median rent and household 
income. If interstate price differences had a material effect on 
our results, the correlation between our selected price 
measures and excess LSC funding would be positive. That is, 
states that our model suggests receive disproportionately large 
amounts of LSC funding relative to their demand for legal 
services would tend to be the states with the highest price 
levels. If this were the case, these states’ supposed “over-
funding” might be the product of higher prices, not 
misallocation of funds. In fact, however, the correlation 
between our price measures and excess LSC funding was 
mildly negative, suggesting that the instances of overfunding 
that our model identifies are not merely the result of omitted 
interstate price variables. 
To estimate the potential effect of inter-service price 
differences, we examined the percentage of cases in each of the 
four major categories that, according to the LSC’s Fact Book 
2010, were disposed of merely with “counsel and advice.”60 
Assuming that dispositions with this classification involved the 
lowest amount of work, we estimated that categories with a 
higher percentage of “counsel and advice” cases were on 
 
60. See LSC, Fact Book 2010, supra note 7, at 19. 
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average less expensive to administer than those with a lower 
percentage. By this metric, consumer finance, with counsel and 
advice accounting for seventy-two percent (72%) of all 
dispositions, is the cheapest to administer, and income, with 
counsel and advice accounting for only fifty-three percent 
(53%), is the most expensive.61 If these differences materially 
affected our results, the correlation between counsel and advice 
percentages and our model’s estimate of over-weighting for a 
given category of legal problems would be negative. This 
follows because what our model interprets as a high β (over-
weighting) might then reflect a category’s high cost of services 
rather than funding misallocation. But, as with the 
correlations discussed above for interstate price differences, the 
relevant correlation here is of the opposite sign to that 
suggesting a material omitted variable problem (and, in this 
case, is slightly positive). 
 
D. LSC Funding 
 
Using the constrained linear regression model discussed in 
Part III.C, we estimate weights with LSC funding as the 
dependent variable. Our estimates are detailed in Table 11 
below. 
 
Table 11: LSC Funding Constrained Linear Regression 
 
Type of Legal 
Problem 
βi 
% of Services 
Actually 
Provided62 
Over 
(Under) 
Weighting 
Consumer Finance  0.46 0.14 0.32 
Family 0.04 0.41 (0.37) 
Housing 0.28 0.30 (0.02) 
Income 0.22 0.15 0.07 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00  
 
 
61. See LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 24-25. 
62. This represents the amount of services provided in the category 
relative to the total amount of services provided in all four categories. 
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As suggested in Part III.C, if funding were allocated 
optimally—in line with demand for services provided—the 
weightings of βi (column two above) would equal the percentage 
of services actually provided (column three above). But instead, 
as Table 11 indicates, states in effect receive far too much LSC 
funding on account of their demand for consumer finance 
services and far too little on account of their demand for family 
services. 
The effects of these disparate weightings are most easily 
viewed on a state level. To that end, we compare the per capita 
LSC funding that a state actually receives with the amount 
that it would receive under an optimal allocation scheme, 
where weights equal relative demand for services. Table 12 and 
Figure 5 below show the five states with the most overfunding 
and the five states with the most underfunding per LSC-
eligible person. 
 
Table 12: Per Capita LSC Overfunding and 
(Underfunding) 
 
State 
Overfunding 
(Underfunding) 
per LSC-
Eligible Person 
Actual LSC 
Funding per 
LSC-Eligible 
Person63 
Actual LSC 
Funding / 
Optimal 
Funding 
South Dakota  $8.30 $16.29 2.0x 
Alaska $6.37 $17.52 1.6x 
Louisiana $4.56 $9.40 1.9x 
New Mexico $3.73 $9.71 1.6x 
Oklahoma $3.40 $8.37 1.7x 
New Hampshire ($4.85) $6.32 0.6x 
Vermont ($5.14) $7.72 0.6x 
New Jersey ($5.46) $7.83 0.6x 
Virginia ($8.05) $7.31 0.5x 
Delaware ($10.79) $6.41 0.4x 
 
63. See LSC, FACT BOOK 2010, supra note 7, at 9-10; SANDEFUR & SMYTH, 
supra note 6, at 31-132. 
33
  
998 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
 
Figure 5: Map of Overfunding and Underfunding by the 
LSC 
 
Table 12 suggests that the differences between actual and 
optimal LSC funding are substantial. Indeed, each eligible 
resident in South Dakota receives twice as much LSC funding 
as an optimal allocation would provide, whereas each eligible 
resident in Delaware receives less than half the optimal 
amount. 
 
E. Non-LSC Funding 
 
But because LSC funding is only one component of overall 
legal services funding, one might argue that legal services 
funding in aggregate may not be misallocated even if LSC 
funding is. Investigating this possibility requires examining 
the interstate allocation of non-LSC funding across states. Yet, 
since non-LSC funding is allocated within states, not across 
states, we cannot think of it in the same terms as LSC funding, 
which amounts to a “federal pie” that can be redistributed 
according to general parameters. 
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Even so, our model will still yield unbiased results on the 
responsiveness of non-LSC funding to our demand indicators, 
provided that there is no omitted variable bias—that is, that 
interstate differences in non-LSC funding do not stem from an 
omitted variable that is correlated with our measures of 
demand.64 While our results in Part II suggest that non-LSC 
funding differs across states for unidentifiable reasons, we are 
unaware of any grounds to believe that these reasons are 
related to the demand for legal services. We therefore are not 
concerned that omitted variable bias influences our analysis. 
Thus, we apply our model to non-LSC funding and report our 
results in Table 13 below. 
 
64. On omitted variable bias, see generally WILLIAM H. GREENE, 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (Macmillan Publ’g Co.2d ed. 1993). 
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Table 13: Non-LSC Funding Constrained Linear 
Regression 
 
A.  Non-LSC 1 
 
Type of Legal 
Problem 
βi 
% of Services 
Actually 
Provided 
Over (Under) 
Weighting 
Consumer Finance  0.00 0.14 (0.14) 
Family 0.62 0.41 0.21 
Housing 0.00 0.30 (0.30) 
Income 0.38 0.15 0.23 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00  
 
 
B. Non-LSC 2 
 
Type of Legal 
Problem 
βi 
% of Services 
Actually 
Provided 
Over (Under) 
Weighting 
Consumer Finance  0.00 0.14 (0.14) 
Family 0.02 0.41 (0.39) 
Housing 0.00 0.30 (0.30) 
Income 0.98 0.15 0.83 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00  
 
 
C. Non-LSC 3 
 
Type of Legal 
Problem 
βi 
% of Services 
Actually 
Provided 
Over (Under) 
Weighting 
Consumer Finance  0.00 0.14 (0.14) 
Family 0.50 0.41 0.09 
Housing 0.00 0.30 (0.30) 
Income 0.50 0.15 0.35 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00  
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Like Table 11, Table 13 reveals significant disparities 
between the actual and optimal allocation of legal services 
funding. However, the disparities for non-LSC funding in many 
instances appear to partly offset those for LSC funding. In 
particular, whereas LSC funding is too sensitive to consumer 
finance by 0.32, all measures of non-LSC funding are not 
sensitive enough by 0.14, and whereas LSC funding is not 
sensitive enough to family by 0.37, non-LSC 1 funding is too 
sensitive by 0.21 and non-LSC 3 funding is too sensitive by 
0.09. This suggests that LSC and non-LSC funding might be 
acting as complements, rather than substitutes. Table 14 
below, applying our model to combined LSC and non-LSC 
funding, corroborates this hypothesis with respect to non-LSC 
1 funding but offers less support for it with respect to non-LSC 
2 and non-LSC 3 funding. 
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Table 14: Total Funding Constrained Linear Regression 
 
A. LSC Funding and Non-LSC 1 
Type of Legal 
Problem 
βi 
% of 
Services 
Actually 
Provided 
Over 
(Under) 
Weighting 
Consumer 
Finance  
0.12 0.14 (0.02) 
Family 0.40 0.41 (0.01) 
Housing 0.22 0.30 (0.08) 
Income 0.26 0.15 0.11 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00  
 
B. LSC Funding and Non-LSC 2 
Type of Legal 
Problem 
βi 
% of 
Services 
Actually 
Provided 
Over 
(Under) 
Weighting 
Consumer 
Finance  
0.11 0.14 (0.03) 
Family 0.06 0.41 (0.35) 
Housing 0.26 0.30 (0.04) 
Income 0.57 0.15 0.42 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00  
 
C. LSC Funding and Non-LSC 3 
Type of Legal 
Problem 
βi 
% of 
Services 
Actually 
Provided 
Over 
(Under) 
Weighting 
Consumer 
Finance  
0.00 0.14 (0.14) 
Family 0.31 0.41 (0.10) 
Housing 0.21 0.30 (0.09) 
Income 0.48 0.15 0.33 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00  
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That non-LSC 1 funding appears to be complementary to 
LSC funding is not surprising given that organizations 
receiving LSC funding are most affected by—and most clearly 
require solutions to—the shortcomings of the current LSC 
funding allocation scheme. But even if some non-LSC funding 
is thus compensating for the shortcomings of the LSC funding 
allocation scheme, we still cannot conclude that flaws in the 
current LSC funding regime are inconsequential. For one, 
Table 14 reveals that our other measures of non-LSC funding 
are at most only weakly complementary to LSC funding. 
Further, even if these measures were far more complementary, 
the LSC funding system would, in our view, still be 
unacceptable. After all, putting the burden on states to patch 
federally bored holes in access to justice (by asking them to 
under- or over-compensate for sub-optimal LSC funding 
decisions) seems rather unfair. In what follows, therefore, we 
propose a new LSC funding system that would reduce the need 
for subsequent funding adjustment by states. 
 
IV.   A New System for the Allocation of LSC Funding 
 
In light of our conclusion in Part III that LSC funding is 
allocated sub-optimally, in this Part, we first propose a model 
that better addresses state-level demand for legal services and 
then respond to possible criticisms of our model. 
 
A. Our Model 
 
The central conclusion of Part III is that LSC funding is 
not allocated in a manner consistent with state-level demand 
for civil legal services. This conclusion should not come as a 
surprise given our finding in Part II that LSC funding is highly 
correlated with LSC eligibility, which one would not expect to 
be a particularly precise proxy for state-level demand for civil 
legal services. In light of our chief conclusion, if the federal 
system takes seriously the ideal of equal access to justice, the 
system for allocating LSC funding should be changed. 
To this end, we propose that the LSC incorporate 
considerations of state-level demand into its funding allocation 
39
  
1004 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
 
decisions. The funding that the LSC distributes to a particular 
state should be linked to the unmet needs for civil legal 
services in the state, which would be a function of the state’s 
demand for civil legal services and the state’s economic ability 
to satisfy this demand. Thus, states with more unmet needs 
(higher demand and lower ability to satisfy it) would receive a 
greater share of LSC allocations. Equation 2 below sketches 
the outlines of this model for a given state i. 
 
Equation 2: Our Model for LSC Allocations 
; 
 
Since the above equation is meant to offer just a basic 
illustration of our model, it does not specify how to measure 
either a state’s demand for legal services or a state’s ability to 
satisfy this demand. But, as we discuss in Part IV.B below, we 
assume that each of these variables can be reasonably 
measured. Under this assumption, our model will clearly result 
in a more optimal allocation of LSC funds than the status quo 
as, unlike the current scheme, it will minimize unmet legal 
services demand. 
 
B. Objections 
 
Our proposal faces at least two possible objections. First, 
the difficulty of defining “unmet legal services demand” may 
create an execution challenge. But while it is true that the 
term cannot be precisely measured, there is no reason why the 
LSC cannot employ reasonable proxies that estimate the 
demand for particular legal services and the extent to which a 
state can afford these services. For example, to estimate state-
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level demand, the LSC could turn to a number of easily 
measurable variables such as the ones that we have examined 
in this study. And to estimate a state’s ability to satisfy this 
demand, the LSC could look at tax revenue and existing 
government expenditures. Based on these estimates, the LSC 
might then assign each state an “unmet legal services demand” 
score, which, as Equation 2 suggests, would be the prime 
determinant of the state’s allocation of LSC funding. 
Accepting our view about the feasibility of measuring 
unmet legal services demand, one might nonetheless raise a 
second objection—that our proposal might encourage 
undesirable behavior from states and individuals. Specifically, 
states might be incentivized to reduce their non-LSC funding 
in the hopes of securing a greater share of funds from the LSC. 
But this type of opportunistic behavior can be easily prevented 
if the LSC does not take into account non-LSC funding at all 
when calculating a state’s composite number. Rather, 
estimates of a state’s ability to pay could simply be based on 
the wealth of the state’s residents and the wealth of its 
government (as measured by per capita tax revenue, for 
example). 
Even if one concedes that state incentives to behave sub-
optimally can thus be curtailed, one might assert that 
individuals will be incentivized to act badly, again in the hopes 
of securing more LSC funds. The argument here is that 
individuals might try to “game” the system by, for example, 
defaulting more, filing more civil challenges, or engaging in 
other behavior that suggests that they have more legal 
demands than they really do. Yet the incentives to engage in 
such behavior are minimal given the considerable personal 
costs of doing so and the limited benefit, in the form of an 
extremely small probability of higher LSC funding, which, on 
the off chance that it materializes, will be spread among a large 
population. 
To be sure, the preceding objections, which are not 
significant in our view, are not the only possible criticisms of 
our proposal. But we are not attempting to deliver a problem-
free alternative. Indeed, there are none. Instead, we wish 
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simply to advance the conversation forward, away from what 
our analysis suggests is an inefficient framework. 
 
V.    Conclusion 
 
In this Article, we investigate the supply of and demand 
for legal services funding across states. After finding that the 
supply of LSC funding is determined almost entirely by the size 
of a state’s LSC-eligible population while the supply of non-
LSC funding is determined idiosyncratically, we examine the 
extent to which state-level demand for civil legal services 
funding matches supply. We principally conclude that with 
respect to LSC funding, state-level demand and supply are 
significantly mismatched. Though we note that the allocation 
of non-LSC funding to LSC-funded organizations in part 
mitigates this mismatch, we argue that the LSC funding 
system should still be improved and propose a system that 
allocates funding based on unmet needs. In our view, such a 
system would help make “justice . . . the same, in substance 
and availability, without regard to economic status,”65 as 
Justice Powell had hoped. 
 
 
65. Powell Remarks, supra note 1.  
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